Very interesting work! What, in your view, constitutes agency? And do you discuss any ways we can use to determine who are agents and who are not, in your full paper? Finally, does your analysis restrict agency to individuals alone or is there scope for even collectives or groups to be agents?
Thanks. Yes, the full paper discusses these issues. Put simply, I understand agency as the capacity for intentional behavior. I mention in the paper that this is a more tractable question than attributing consciousness, and I argue that we have good reason to think many invertebrates are agents even if they might not be conscious. I leave the door open to artificial agents (AI, robots, digital beings) and collectives (corporations, clubs, bands, etc.).
This is really exciting work and would love to read a full draft soon! Out of curiosity, have you interacted with Jeff Sebo’s (2017) "Agency and Moral Status"? From memory, that paper may offer a lot of interesting/beneficial overlap with your own conception of moral status as it corresponds to agency.
Very interesting work! What, in your view, constitutes agency? And do you discuss any ways we can use to determine who are agents and who are not, in your full paper? Finally, does your analysis restrict agency to individuals alone or is there scope for even collectives or groups to be agents?
Thanks. Yes, the full paper discusses these issues. Put simply, I understand agency as the capacity for intentional behavior. I mention in the paper that this is a more tractable question than attributing consciousness, and I argue that we have good reason to think many invertebrates are agents even if they might not be conscious. I leave the door open to artificial agents (AI, robots, digital beings) and collectives (corporations, clubs, bands, etc.).
This is really exciting work and would love to read a full draft soon! Out of curiosity, have you interacted with Jeff Sebo’s (2017) "Agency and Moral Status"? From memory, that paper may offer a lot of interesting/beneficial overlap with your own conception of moral status as it corresponds to agency.
Hi, and thank you. I'm well aware of Sebo's paper and discuss it briefly in the full paper and elsewhere. It's good stuff!